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Universities:  
The Fallen Angels of Bayh-Dole?
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert Cook-Deegan
Abstract: The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 established a new default rule that allowed nonprofit organizations 
and small businesses to own, as a routine matter, patents on inventions resulting from research sponsored by 
the federal government. Although universities helped get the Bayh-Dole Act through Congress, the primary 
goal, as reflected in the recitals at the beginning of the new statute, was not to benefit universities but to pro-
mote the commercial development and utilization of federally funded inventions. In the years since the pas-
sage of the Bayh-Dole Act, universities seem to have lost sight of this distinction. Their behavior as patent 
seekers, patent enforcers, and patent policy stakeholders often seems to work against the commercialization 
goals of the Bayh-Dole Act and is difficult to explain or justify on any basis other than the pursuit of revenue. 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 established a new de-
fault rule that allowed nonprofit organizations and 
small businesses to own, as a routine matter, patents 
on inventions resulting from research sponsored by 
the federal government.1 The new law replaced di-
vergent and changeable rules and practices of dif-
ferent federal funding agencies. It made ownership 
more predictable and reduced the need for case-by-
case negotiations to secure rights.2 
University patent ownership featured prominent-
ly in subsequent commentary on the Bayh-Dole Act, 
but the initial choice to limit the new rule to nonprof-
it organizations and small businesses was a matter 
of political expediency. Although universities helped 
get the Bayh-Dole Act through Congress, the prima-
ry goal, as reflected in the recitals at the beginning of 
the statute, was not to benefit universities but to pro-
mote the commercial development and utilization of 
federally funded inventions.3 It was part of a broad-
er initiative to give patent ownership to research con-
tractors, rather than to federal funding agencies, in 
order to accelerate commercial development. By ap-
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plying the new default ownership rule only 
to nonprofit organizations (including uni-
versities) and small businesses, advocates 
sidestepped decades-old objections to giv-
ing patent monopolies to powerful busi-
ness interests when inventions were made 
at taxpayer expense. Had large businesses 
been included in Bayh-Dole, an anonymous 
Senate aide confided to a reporter, “the bill 
would never have [had] a chance of pass-
ing.”4 But the limitation was only tempo-
rary. Soon enough, the new policy was ex-
tended to large businesses, first quietly in an 
executive order signed by President Ronald 
Reagan, and then more durably in an incon-
spicuous amendment to the statute.5 
Universities fit awkwardly in the argu-
ments for patent ownership by contrac-
tors rather than government agencies. 
Advocates emphasized that government 
agencies do not commercialize inventions 
themselves, and therefore government 
ownership inevitably required costly li-
censing transactions to transfer the rights 
that firms required to protect investments 
in commercialization. Government stew-
ards might be cautious about giving public 
property away to private firms, introduc-
ing uncertainty and delay. When the con-
tractor was a private firm, commercializa-
tion could proceed more quickly by vest-
ing rights in the contractor from the outset. 
But universities are quite different from pri-
vate firms. Like the government, universi-
ties do not themselves commercialize in-
ventions, but must license their patents 
for commercialization to proceed. More-
over, in 1980, most universities were rela-
tive newcomers to the patent system, hav-
ing generally avoided patenting for much of 
the twentieth century, concerned that pat-
enting conflicted with their mission to dis-
seminate knowledge.6 Universities had no 
more, and arguably less, expertise in licens-
ing than the government agencies that were 
criticized as ineffective, and had a similar 
history of hostility toward patents. 
Universities had, however, another ar-
gument for patent ownership: only they 
could provide the close collaboration be-
tween faculty and commercial licensees 
necessary to achieve effective technology 
transfer for early-stage inventions made in 
academic laboratories. Patent ownership 
would give universities and their faculties 
incentives to secure patent rights and to 
aid commercial licensees in developing 
their inventions and bringing them to mar-
ket. Otherwise, universities would have 
little reason to divert time and resourc-
es away from their academic missions in 
order to secure patents and to collaborate 
with licensees. Universities’ history of for-
saking patents in favor of publication and 
the dissemination of knowledge made this 
account plausible. It also made universi-
ties seem more trustworthy than business 
firms: universities would use their patents 
for public benefit rather than private gain. 
The perceived halos over universities lit 
the path to passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
As a justification for university patents, 
the logic of technology transfer has limits. 
Some university inventions surely fit the 
paradigm of early-stage discoveries requir-
ing further substantial private investment, 
assisted by university scientists, to launch 
as commercial products. An important ex-
ample highlighted in the Bayh-Dole hear-
ings was candidate drugs funded by the 
National Institutes of Health (nih) medic-
inal chemistry program. Private firms had 
proven unwilling to develop these drugs 
and to shepherd them through the fda 
approval process under the terms of nih 
agreements from the 1960s that restrict-
ed the firms’ ability to secure exclusive 
rights.7 Exclusive patent rights were nec-
essary to motivate pharmaceutical firms to 
invest in expensive clinical trials of prom-
ising new drugs. The nih responded by de-
veloping Institutional Patent Agreements 
(ipas) that enabled universities to patent 
drugs resulting from federally funded re-
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search and to license their rights to firms. 
But some ipas were stalled in administra-
tive review while Bayh-Dole was pending, 
fueling university interest in codifying pat-
ent ownership rules.
Many university inventions, however, do 
not require substantial postdiscovery in-
vestment and the assistance of faculty in-
ventors to achieve commercial application. 
Some of the most lucrative university pat-
ents covered broad enabling technologies 
that would have been ready for widespread 
use with or without university patents. 
These included the Cohen-Boyer patents on 
basic recombinant dna techniques (which 
have generated approximately $255 million 
for Stanford University and the Universi-
ty of California) and the Axel patents on 
methods to introduce genes for foreign pro-
teins in eukaryotes (which have generated 
approximately $800 million for Columbia 
University).8 Such technologies face little 
risk of languishing in academic archives if 
they are published without patents. Patent-
ing them may provide revenue for universi-
ties, but it does not further Bayh-Dole’s ex-
plicit goal of promoting the development 
and dissemination of new technologies. Ac-
cording to Niels Reimers, who developed 
the licensing scheme for the Cohen-Boyer 
patents, patents on such platform technolo-
gies impose a “tax” on subsequent applica-
tions, redounding to the benefit of univer-
sities, which then use the funds for educa-
tion and research.9 Universities prize such 
patents as a source of unfettered discretion-
ary funds, but they do not promote com-
mercialization; rather, they make commer-
cial development more costly by imposing a 
need to negotiate and pay for licenses.
Congress recognized that contractor 
ownership might not be the best way to 
achieve its goals in all cases. Bayh-Dole pro-
vided several mechanisms to depart from 
this default rule in the terms of funding 
agreements. In “exceptional circumstanc-
es,” the agency could determine that with-
holding title to the invention would better 
promote the goals of the Act.10 An agen-
cy could also exercise statutory “march-
in rights” to license Bayh-Dole patents if 
it determined that the university or its ex-
clusive licensee was not taking steps to 
achieve “practical application of the sub-
ject invention” or, if necessary, “to alleviate 
public health or safety needs.”11 Finally, the 
government retained a paid-up, nonexclu-
sive license to use or to authorize others to 
use the inventions on behalf of the govern-
ment.12 But federal research sponsors have 
made little use of these provisions to date, 
perhaps because of burdensome proce-
dural requirements.13 These requirements 
were no accident. The architects of Bayh-
Dole sought to overcome hostility toward 
patents in universities and in some fund-
ing agencies that they saw as an obstacle to 
commercial development. 
The statute did not limit the new owner-
ship rule to inventions requiring follow-on 
investment to promote development. And 
universities have not imposed such limits 
on themselves.14 Universities soon came to 
regard their Bayh-Dole patents as entitle-
ments, using them to generate revenue even 
when licensing rights were unnecessary for 
commercialization. The result may actual-
ly impede commercialization in some cas-
es, and certainly makes it more expensive.
The drafters of the Bayh-Dole Act may 
have failed to realize that antipatent atti-
tudes were quickly declining in the acad-
emy. Bayh-Dole accelerated a trend that 
was well under way in the 1970s to reverse 
formal policies against patenting and to 
establish university technology transfer 
offices.15 As economist Bhaven Sampat 
observes, Bayh-Dole fostered university 
patenting “by providing strong Congres-
sional endorsement for the position that 
active university involvement in patent-
ing and licensing, far from being ignoble, 
serves the public interest.”16 Perhaps uni-
versities could keep their halos while plow-
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ing patent revenues back into research and 
education.
One could argue for university patent 
ownership as a way to give universities fi-
nancial rewards for valuable inventions. 
Notably, this is not among the seven goals 
recited in the Bayh-Dole preamble.17 Such 
an explicit recital might well have drawn 
political fire. But the argument was not 
even made.
Sometimes legislation enacted for one 
purpose turns out to serve another, equal-
ly important purpose. Whatever the intent 
in 1980, enhancing university revenues 
through patents may now seem like sound 
policy. But even now, the revenue-for-uni-
versities rationale is raised only sotto voce, if 
at all. In case after case, universities justify 
their patent rights by appealing to the dan-
ger of inventions languishing for lack of pat-
ent protection, even when university pat-
ents are plainly unnecessary for commer-
cialization. The argument persists because 
promoting commercialization, not revenue, 
was the foremost justification for universi-
ty patent ownership in the Bayh-Dole Act. 
The overall impact of Bayh-Dole has been 
a topic of lively debate in the thirty-eight 
years since its passage.18 University patent-
ing has dramatically increased, and a few 
universities have made a lot of money from 
royalties. Yet licensing revenues remain a 
small portion of university budgets overall. 
Respondents to a 2015 survey of the Associ-
ation of University Technology Managers 
reported $2.5 billion in licensing revenues 
(including revenues from trademark, copy-
right, and unpatented technologies). This 
is less than 4 percent of the $66.6 billion in 
university research expenditures, with the 
wealthiest universities capturing most of 
the benefits. Although university technol-
ogy transfer professionals take credit for 
stimulating commercial development of 
new technologies, it is not clear how much 
of that development would have occurred 
without university patents.
In the post–Bayh-Dole era, universities 
 –the third-largest employer of lobbyists–
have had some success in getting Congress 
to shape patent law to favor their inter-
ests.19 They have secured statutory chang-
es that fortify university patents and make 
it harder for firms to avoid liability for in-
fringing them. 
Meanwhile, universities have had impor- 
tant losses in the courts, especially before 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (Federal Circuit), an intermedi-
ate appellate court with consolidated juris-
diction over patent matters. In a growing 
body of case law, the courts have refused to 
adapt patent doctrine to accommodate the 
circumstances of university research, some-
times with open skepticism toward argu-
ments that universities are acting in the pub-
lic interest. At times, special pleading from 
universities seems to have backfired, pro-
voking courts to fortify doctrines that lim-
it the patenting of the kinds of early-stage 
discoveries that universities often produce.
Universities have, in many cases, pursued 
patents that they could enforce against 
product-developing firms for the evident 
purpose of getting a piece of the action in 
lucrative technologies that were already 
being actively developed without the need 
for university patents. They have some-
times worn their academic halos to court, 
seeking to adapt patent doctrine to privi-
lege the interests of universities over the 
competing interests of product-developing 
firms. This agenda has met with consider-
able skepticism from the Federal Circuit, 
which has sometimes explicitly questioned 
whether university patents are promoting 
or impeding commercial product devel-
opment. 
An early sign that universities were pursu-
ing patents that were unnecessary for com-
mercial development was the involvement 
of universities in interference proceed-
ings–administrative proceedings within 
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the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to de-
termine priority of invention–in which the 
university claimed to have made the inven-
tion before a commercial inventor. When a 
university competes with a near-simulta-
neous commercial inventor seeking patent 
rights on the same invention, it is difficult 
to argue that the university is just trying to 
preserve incentives for commercialization 
of an invention that would otherwise fail to 
attract commercial interest. Interferences 
are only available to establish priority for 
patent applications filed before March 16, 
2013, when U.S. law changed to award pri-
ority to the first inventor to file a patent ap-
plication rather than to the first to make the 
invention.20 But before that date, interfer-
ences were especially common in biotech-
nology, a field in which multiple research 
teams often compete intensely to reach the 
same goals (such as cloning an obviously 
important gene). Health policy scholars 
Jonathan Merz and Michelle Henry found 
that interferences in biotechnology and or-
ganic chemistry were six times more fre-
quent than for patents on average, and that 
most of the highly competitive “races” the 
authors cited involved academic research 
institutions.21 
Having to litigate a costly interference 
against a university can only increase the 
costs and risks facing a product-develop-
ing firm. Yet universities persisted in these 
costly battles, appealing to the Federal Cir-
cuit when they lost in the Patent Office. In 
a priority dispute between academic patent 
applicants and a pharmaceutical firm over 
an assay to identify anticancer compounds, 
for example, the University of Texas South-
western Medical School pursued repeated 
appeals to the Federal Circuit, although pre-
sumably the firm’s commercialization in-
centives would have been adequately pro-
tected by its own already-issued patent on 
the same invention.22 
Another strategy for universities more 
interested in revenues than in promoting 
product development is to seek broad pat-
ent rights on the basis of preliminary aca-
demic research that would allow them to 
sue private firms that later develop prod-
ucts not disclosed in the university pat-
ent applications. The Federal Circuit has 
been consistently hostile to these efforts, 
invalidating university patents in a series 
of decisions that fortified the patent law re-
quirement that a patent application must 
include a “written description” of the in-
vention.23  
Regents of the University of California v. Eli 
Lilly involved the first commercial recom-
binant dna product that ever reached the 
market: human insulin.24 University of 
California (uc) researchers, having cloned 
the rat insulin gene, obtained a broad pat-
ent covering recombinant microorganisms 
with dna sequences encoding human insu-
lin, mammalian insulin, and vertebrate in-
sulin, although the only sequence they dis-
closed was for rat insulin.25 Meanwhile, sci-
entists at Genentech successfully cloned the 
human insulin gene and produced recom-
binant human insulin. The pharmaceutical 
firm Eli Lilly manufactured and distribut-
ed the final product, which began to replace 
the previously used insulin product puri-
fied from slaughtered pigs as a treatment 
for diabetes. The University of California 
sued Eli Lilly and Genentech for patent in-
fringement. On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
held the uc patent invalid on the basis of 
what was then a controversial application 
of the written description requirement. The 
Federal Circuit held that the written de-
scription in the uc patent disclosure only 
showed possession of the gene for rat insu-
lin, and because the human insulin gene had 
a slightly different dna sequence (because 
the human insulin protein has a somewhat 
different amino acid sequence), the patent 
disclosure was insufficient to support the 
claims to genes for human insulin and for 
all vertebrate and mammalian insulins. Eli 
Lilly and Genentech were therefore free to 
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market recombinant human insulin with-
out liability to the University of California.
Later cases used the invigorated writ-
ten description requirement to invalidate 
broad university patent claims to methods 
of treatment based on discoveries of meta-
bolic pathways likely to be useful in devel-
oping new drugs. In University of Rochester v. 
G. D. Searle, the Federal Circuit invalidated 
claims that would have allowed the Univer-
sity of Rochester to demand royalties from 
pharmaceutical firms that had developed 
any selective Cox-2 inhibitors.26 Cox-2 in-
hibitors are anti-inflammatory drugs with 
fewer gastrointestinal side effects than as-
pirin.27 The Federal Circuit invalidated the 
university’s patent on a “method for selec-
tively inhibiting pghs-2 activity in a hu-
man host” for lack of an adequate written 
description. The inventors developed an 
assay to identify Cox-2 inhibitors, but did 
not identify or describe any specific inhib-
itors. The court explicitly rejected the argu-
ment that this holding “will have a signifi-
cant impact on the continuing viability of 
technology transfer programs at universi-
ties and on the equitable allocation of intel-
lectual property rights between universities 
and the private sector,” noting that “none 
of the . . . policy objectives of the Bayh-Dole 
Act encourages or condones less stringent 
application of the patent laws to universi-
ties than to other entities.”28 
The Federal Circuit was even more em-
phatic in its en banc decision in Ariad Pharma-
ceuticals v. Eli Lilly.29 Researchers at Harvard 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (mit) described the nf𝜘b path-
way that explained the mechanisms of ac-
tion of several blockbuster drugs. As in the 
Rochester case, the university researchers 
had not actually found an inhibitory com-
pound, but their patents broadly claimed 
methods of regulating nf𝜘b activity. The 
Harvard/mit patents were licensed ex-
clusively to Ariad Pharmaceuticals, which 
sued Eli Lilly, developer of the nf𝜘b inhib-
itors Evista and Xigris. The Federal Circuit 
seemed to view the university patents as an-
ticipatory poaching of the work of the phar-
maceutical industry rather than as essential 
enablers of commercialization:
Such claims merely recite a description of the 
problem to be solved while claiming all solu-
tions to it . . . leaving it to the pharmaceutical 
industry to complete an unfinished invention. 
Ariad complains that the doctrine disadvan-
tages universities to the extent that basic re-
search cannot be patented. But the patent 
law has always been directed to the “useful 
Arts,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8, meaning in-
ventions with a practical use . . . and univer-
sities may not have the resources or inclina-
tion to work out the practical implications of 
all such research, i.e., finding and identifying 
compounds able to affect the mechanism dis-
covered. That is no failure of the law’s inter-
pretation, but its intention. . . . [The law] limits 
patent protection to those who actually per-
form the difficult work of “invention”–that 
is, conceive of the complete and final inven-
tion with all its claimed limitations–and dis-
close the fruits of that effort to the public.30
The Federal Circuit rejected arguments 
that the “written description” doctrine 
that it had used to invalidate this and oth-
er broad university patents on early-stage 
discoveries removed incentives for pri-
vate investment in the commercialization 
of university inventions. Perhaps these ar-
guments seemed particularly unpersuasive 
in a lawsuit against a firm that had devel-
oped and brought to market two commer-
cial products without the benefit of any pro-
tection provided by the university patents. 
The practical significance of this line of 
cases has been partially eclipsed by more 
recent decisions from the U.S. Supreme 
Court limiting patentable subject matter. 
These decisions, which preclude patents 
on natural products, laws of nature, and 
phenomena of nature, provide an alterna-
tive basis for invalidating university pat-
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ents arising from fundamental discoveries 
about biochemical pathways.31 Universi-
ties participated in amicus briefs that un-
successfully argued against the approach 
ultimately taken by the Court. The Su-
preme Court holdings extend beyond the 
problem of reach-through patents from 
universities–the cases that gave rise to 
the robust written description require-
ment from the Federal Circuit–and call 
into question the validity of many com-
mercial patents in the life sciences.32 
Yet both the Federal Circuit’s written 
description requirement and the Supreme 
Court’s patentable subject matter doctrine 
reflect similar concerns: that broad patents 
on early research discoveries might hin-
der science and impede rather than pro-
mote applications of those discoveries. Al-
though both written description and pat-
entable subject matter doctrines apply to 
all patents, they present more of an obsta-
cle to patenting early stage research discov-
eries from university laboratories than to 
patenting commercial products. Universi-
ties argued that these consequences contra-
vened the purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act, 
but to no avail. These decisions thus repre-
sent significant losses for universities and 
provide a countervailing narrative to the 
story that university patents are necessary 
for commercial development. 
In addition to seeking patents that are not 
necessary to promote commercialization, 
universities have put revenue goals ahead 
of commercialization by enforcing their 
patents in litigation against firms that have 
already developed successful commercial 
products without the benefit of universi-
ty patents.33 
A recent example that reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court is Stanford University v. Roche 
Molecular Systems.34 The patents at issue 
arose from nih-funded research performed 
by Mark Holodniy, a Stanford postdoctoral 
fellow. Stanford researchers were collabo-
rating with scientists at the private firm Ce-
tus to develop an hiv assay using the poly-
merase chain reaction (pcr). pcr is an im-
portant technology developed at Cetus that 
later won its inventor, Kary Mullis, a Nobel 
Prize. Stanford sent Holodniy to Cetus to 
learn pcr and to work on an hiv assay. Ho-
lodniy then returned to Stanford and tested 
the assay in the clinic with other Stanford 
inventors before Stanford filed patent ap-
plications. Meanwhile, Roche acquired Ce-
tus’s pcr patent rights and began manufac-
turing pcr-based hiv detection kits. After 
the patents were issued to Stanford, Stan-
ford sought royalties from Roche. When 
they failed to reach agreement, Stanford 
sued Roche for patent infringement. On ap-
peal, the Federal Circuit ruled that Roche, 
rather than Stanford, was the true owner 
of Holodniy’s interest in the patents based 
upon its technical analysis of the legal ef-
fects of the terms of two different agree-
ments: a “Visitor Confidentiality Agree-
ment” that Holodniy signed at Cetus and 
a “Copyright and Patent Agreement” that 
he had previously signed at Stanford.35 The 
Supreme Court granted review to consider 
whether the Bayh-Dole Act required a dif-
ferent result.36 
Stanford made a compelling argument 
that allocation of ownership to Cetus/
Roche contravened the design of the Bayh-
Dole Act to give universities (and other con-
tractors) the first option to claim rights in 
inventions made in federally sponsored re-
search. As Justice Breyer explained in a dis-
senting opinion, contractor ownership is 
necessary to ensure compliance with a set 
of conditions that the Bayh-Dole Act re-
quires be included in research funding 
agreements to protect the public inter-
est.37 These include provisions for reten-
tion of government licenses, reporting 
obligations, and restrictions on permissi-
ble assignments. These safeguards are lost 
when inventions are assigned–even inad-
vertently, as apparently happened in this 
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case–to third parties not bound by those 
agreements. Moreover, the Bayh-Dole Act 
contemplates a clear hierarchy of claims 
to patent ownership with the contractor 
first in line, followed by the sponsor, and 
with inventors allowed to claim owner-
ship only when neither the contractor nor 
the sponsor objects.38 Justice Roberts’s ma-
jority opinion inverts this order by holding 
that the Bayh-Dole Act applies only to in-
ventions owned by the contractor, and not 
to inventions that employees fail to assign 
properly to contractors. Although the ma-
jority opinion purports to apply strict textu-
al analysis to the language of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, it ignores many textual cues about the 
design of the statute that support a differ-
ent interpretation. 
On the other hand, it is hard to argue that 
Stanford’s assertion of patent rights pro-
moted commercialization. Roche devel-
oped the technology commercially years 
before Stanford’s patents issued. Roche 
clearly did not rely on Stanford’s patents. 
The patents did not help Roche, but rath-
er gave Stanford an opportunity to claim a 
share of the proceeds. 
Hard cases make bad law. To the ex-
tent that Stanford v. Roche calls into ques-
tion whether universities hold secure title 
to the patents they are trying to license, it 
jeopardizes the commercialization goals 
of the Bayh-Dole Act as well as the protec-
tions for the public interest that the Bayh-
Dole Act addresses in the terms of fund-
ing agreements. Stanford’s overreaching 
in this particular case, where university 
patents were unnecessary for commercial-
ization, may threaten future rights where 
clear university title is essential for further 
development.
In 2008, intellectual property law scholar 
Mark Lemley posed the provocative ques-
tion, “are universities patent trolls?”39 The 
idea that universities can be patent trolls 
(that is, patent assertion entities that do 
not themselves commercialize technolo-
gy but profit by asserting patents against 
commercial firms) soon became more 
commonplace, as major research universi-
ties used their patents to collect hundreds 
of millions of dollars in damage awards and 
settlements.40 Criticized for behaving like 
patent trolls, universities have sometimes 
sought to avoid the reputational costs of lit-
igation by selling their rights to undisputed 
patent trolls.41 
Like patent assertion entities, universities 
can enforce their patents with little fear of 
provoking counterclaims for infringement 
of the patents held by the defendants. Pat-
ent infringement litigation against univer-
sities and academic researchers is quite 
rare. This allows university scientists to in-
fringe patents in their laboratories with rel-
ative impunity even as universities enforce 
their patents against other institutions.42 
But this is largely the result of forbearance 
by patent owners rather than legal immu-
nity from suit.
Universities lost a claim to special status 
as infringement defendants in the case of 
Madey v. Duke University.43 Physicist John 
Madey sued Duke for using his patent-
ed field electron laser in a university lab-
oratory. Rejecting Duke’s argument that 
the noncommercial character of academ-
ic work precludes infringement liability, 
the Federal Circuit held that the universi-
ty would be liable for any use that was in 
keeping with the “legitimate business” of 
the university:
For example, major research universities, 
such as Duke, often sanction and fund re-
search projects with arguably no commer-
cial application whatsoever. However, these 
projects unmistakably further the institu-
tion’s legitimate business objectives, includ-
ing educating and enlightening students and 
faculty participating in these projects. These 
projects also serve, for example, to increase 
the status of the institution and lure lucra-
tive research grants, students, and faculty.44
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In a footnote, the court added that “Duke 
. . . like other major research institutions of 
higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an 
aggressive patent licensing program from 
which it derives a not insubstantial reve-
nue stream.”45 In other words, to the Fed-
eral Circuit, universities are not angels en-
titled to a privileged status in the patent sys-
tem, but rather a particular kind of worldly 
institution pursuing its own objectives, in-
cluding money.
Other academics may have more to gain 
than commercial firms from suing academ-
ic institutions for patent infringement. In-
deed, Madey v. Duke was a lawsuit brought 
by a faculty member against his former 
university. In another currently pending 
case, the University of South Florida has 
sued both the nih and the nonprofit Jack-
son Laboratories for making and distribut-
ing transgenic mice that are used in Alzhei-
mer’s disease research.46 The cases may or 
may not succeed, but the fact that a univer-
sity would bring these lawsuits suggests a 
decline of academic sharing norms as uni-
versities seek to profit from their patents. 
Universities have also sought to expand 
their patent rights by lobbying Congress to 
change the patent laws in their favor, with 
mixed results. 
This strategy backfired in a campaign by 
Columbia University to extend the term of 
its lucrative Axel patents. Columbia worked 
through Senator Judd Gregg of New Hamp-
shire, a Columbia alumnus, who introduced 
three different bills in an attempt to extend 
Columbia’s patent term.47 The patents were 
then under license to multiple commercial 
firms, none of which stood to benefit by 
prolonging their royalty obligations to Co-
lumbia. When Senator Gregg’s backroom 
legislative maneuvers became public, there 
was a strong backlash against both him and 
Columbia from drug manufacturers, con-
sumer groups, and other members of Con-
gress. Senator Gregg responded that Co-
lumbia was “a poor little university” con-
tending with “a fair amount of greed on the 
part of the drug companies.”48 This phrase 
came back to haunt Columbia when some 
of its licensees sued to invalidate one of Co-
lumbia’s patents. During a hearing in that 
case, the District Court judge, observing 
eight lawyers for Columbia in his court-
room, quipped “I thought Columbia was a 
nonprofit organization who couldn’t afford 
this litigation.”49 In 2004, Columbia signed 
covenants not to sue the companies for in-
fringement of the disputed patent, and lat-
er that year further agreed not to sue any-
one else and backed away from demanding 
royalties.50 
Other university lobbying efforts have 
been more successful, leading to statuto-
ry changes that make it easier for universi-
ties to obtain and enforce patents.51 Some 
of these moves have been broadly congru-
ent with the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act. The 
create Act of 2004, for example, facilitates 
university-industry research collaborations 
by extending the benefit of a statutory safe 
harbor that, as originally enacted, prevent-
ed the use of nonpublic information as pat-
ent-defeating prior art against patent appli-
cations filed by other employees within the 
same firm.52 As amended by the create 
Act, the safe harbor also applies to informa-
tion belonging to another party to a joint 
research agreement.53 This is consistent 
with the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act. 
The recitals in the Bayh-Dole Act reflect a 
clear intent “to promote collaboration be-
tween commercial concerns and nonprofit 
organizations, including universities,” and 
the statutory change facilitates such inter-
actions by allowing free communication in 
the course of such collaborations without 
fear of losing patent rights.54 
Universities had a significant impact on 
the new first-to-file rules in the America 
Invents Act of 2011 (aia). That legislation 
changed U.S. law to conform to patent laws 
of other countries by shifting from the in-
147 (4)  Fall 2018 85
Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg 
& Robert 
Cook-Deegan
vention date to the application filing date 
as the time for determining whether an 
invention is patentable in light of the pri-
or art. Universities initially opposed this 
change. They worried that the first-to-file 
priority rule might force them to incur sub-
stantial patent filing costs to preserve pri-
ority, and that scientists would be unwill-
ing to defer publication until after patent 
filing.55 In the end, universities persuaded 
Congress to modify the new rule to retain 
a modified version of a one-year “grace pe-
riod” from prior U.S. law.56 The grace peri-
od gives inventors a year after public disclo-
sure before they lose the right to file patent 
applications.
Although the grace period is formally 
available to all inventors, it is most likely to 
benefit universities. Commercial firms that 
plan to seek patent rights in other countries 
are unlikely to rely on it, because public dis-
closures in the United States would defeat 
their patent rights elsewhere. But to the 
extent that it facilitates early publication 
of research results, the grace period may 
encourage prompt dissemination of new 
knowledge. 
It is harder to identify a public policy 
argument, however, for changes that uni-
versities secured to a “prior user” infringe-
ment defense in the aia. Like the modi-
fied grace period, this provision grew out 
of university resistance to a proposed 
change in the law. In 1999, following un-
expected decisions of the Federal Circuit 
upholding patents on methods of doing 
business, Congress enacted a new “prior 
user” infringement defense, initially avail-
able only against business method pat-
ents.57 This defense protected a user who, 
acting in good faith, completed the inven-
tion at least one year before the patent fil-
ing date and commercially used it before 
the filing date.
The aia expanded the prior user defense 
in several ways. It broadened it to cover all 
patents, not just patents on business meth-
ods.58 It extended the defense to certain re-
lated parties and assignees of the original 
prior user. And although it retained the lan-
guage about “commercial use,” in a bow to 
universities, it added a new provision de-
fining commercial use to include “use by 
a nonprofit laboratory or other nonprofit 
entity such as a university or hospital, for 
which the public is the intended beneficia-
ry.” So far so good: expanding the prior user 
defense to include universities was entire-
ly consistent with the goals of Bayh-Dole.
More troubling, however, was a change 
that effectively eliminated prior user rights 
as a defense to infringement of university 
patents. In response to university lobbying, 
Congress added the so-called university ex-
ception. Under that exception, a defendant 
may not invoke the prior user defense if the 
invention “was, at the time the invention 
was made, owned or subject to an obliga-
tion of assignment to . . . an institution of 
higher education.”59 In other words, when 
universities are sued as infringement defen-
dants, they can invoke prior user rights to 
avoid liability, but when universities as-
sert their patents against others, prior user 
rights are unavailable to defendants. This 
turns the commercialization justification 
for the Bayh-Dole Act upside down. Rath-
er than using their patents to help commer-
cial firms develop early stage academic in-
ventions into useful products, universities 
(and only universities) may now use their 
patents to sue firms that are so far ahead of 
academic scientists that they had already 
put the invention to commercial use a full 
year before the university filed a patent ap-
plication. Moreover, since the “university 
exception” turns not on current ownership, 
but on whether there was an obligation to 
assign at the time the invention was made, 
the defense remains unavailable even if the 
university later sells the patent to a patent 
assertion entity (that is, a patent troll).
The statutory text shows vestigial rem-
nants of a university halo. The expansion 
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of the prior user defense to university labo-
ratories includes the qualification that the 
use be one “for which the public is the in-
tended beneficiary.”60 But universities tar-
nished their halos by persuading Congress 
to eliminate prior user rights as a defense 
against university patents. 
These successes in getting Congress to 
give universities special treatment under 
patent law show that the university tech-
nology transfer community has become a 
force to be reckoned with in patent policy. 
But they also show universities using their 
lobbying muscle in unabashed pursuit of 
their own financial interests rather than 
broader public interests in the dissemi-
nation and utilization of new knowledge. 
The Bayh-Dole Act chose universities and 
small businesses as the first beneficiaries of 
a broader policy shift that aimed to facili-
tate the commercialization of inventions 
made in the course of government-spon-
sored research. It allocated ownership of 
patent rights to contractors rather than to 
government funding agencies. Universi-
ties, as traditional champions of free dis-
semination of new knowledge, were re-
garded as trustworthy stewards of patent 
rights for the public benefit, in contrast to 
the big business contractors who later bene-
fited from the same policy. The focus on uni-
versities and small businesses made it eas-
ier to pass the legislation. Nonetheless, the 
clear goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was not to 
generate revenues for universities on gov-
ernment-sponsored research, but rather to 
facilitate commercial development of new 
technologies that needed patent incentives 
to induce postdiscovery private investment.
In the years since passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act, universities seem to have lost 
sight of this distinction. Their behavior as 
patent seekers, patent enforcers, and pat-
ent policy stakeholders often seems to work 
against the commercialization goals of the 
Bayh-Dole Act and is difficult to explain or 
justify on any basis other than the pursuit 
of revenue. 
Universities do good work, and more rev-
enue allows them to do more of it. But rev-
enues from university-owned patents re-
main a small source of revenue for univer-
sities overall, and in total account for less 
than 5 percent of universities’ research ex-
penditures. The policy question is: when 
do the benefits of university patents justi-
fy the costs? Meanwhile, technology trans-
fer offices, as opposed to faculty, have come 
to dominate the voice of universities in de-
bates about patent policy. The result is a tail-
wagging-the-dog distortion, in which the 
interests of universities as patent owners 
may be overwhelming their broader inter-
ests in widespread dissemination and uti-
lization of new knowledge for the public 
benefit.
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